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he cost of litigation has skyrocketed in recent years—and is only 
expected to climb.  Discovery is one of the most expensive 
components of the litigation process, estimated to be responsible for 
at least half of the costs incurred in litigation.1  As electronically 
stored information (ESI) becomes a larger and larger component of 
discovery, the price tag will only increase.  But discovery, the process 
by which parties uncover information necessary to make their cases, 
is one of the most important components of litigation. 
Civil litigation in the United States, regulated by rules of civil 
procedure at the state and federal levels, relies heavily on discovery.  
It is in discovery that parties uncover facts and clarify the issues.  To 
facilitate these goals, the civil procedure rules have embraced broad 
discovery practices, which are also termed open or liberal discovery.  
However, broad discovery, while valued in theory, is susceptible to 
abuse in practice.  Attorneys can use discovery to delay proceedings 
and burden opponents with discovery requests.  Attorneys can hide 
behind the goal of broad discovery to embark on potential fishing 
expeditions, a situation described as “overdiscovery.” 
Regulators at both the state and federal levels have taken note of 
this risk and sought to limit the potential for abusive discovery 
practices, while still giving life to the value of broad discovery and 
allowing discovery to serve its role in civil practice.  Traditionally, 
there are few limitations on discovery.  At the federal level, there are 
three key limitations on discovery: the scope of discovery, protective 
orders, and the Proportionality Rule.  In Oregon civil practice, which 
is patterned on the federal model, the scope of discovery and 
protective orders are the two key limitations; Oregon does not have 
the Proportionality Rule. 
 
1 Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The 
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 892 (2009) 
(citing Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure 
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 548 (1998)). 
T
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The Proportionality Rule requires that the burden of a discovery 
request be proportional to the value of the discovered information to 
the proceeding.  If the burden outweighs the reward, then the 
discovery request must be denied.  This rule is an appropriate 
response to the growing cost and scope of discovery, particularly in 
the e-discovery age.  It realizes the goal of broad discovery while 
guarding against discovery abuse.  The absence of the Proportionality 
Rule in Oregon opens the state up to potential abusive discovery 
practices, particularly in the realm of e-discovery. 
E-discovery, or the discovery of ESI, is an increasingly large 
component of discovery.  The nature of e-discovery differs from more 
traditional sources.  This distinction necessitates that e-discovery 
receive special attention in the rules of civil procedure.  This process 
has begun at the federal level, as amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) have been enacted to address e-discovery 
practices specifically.  Oregon has yet to follow the FRCP’s lead.  
Adopting the Proportionality Rule would help to mitigate the impact 
of e-discovery in Oregon by providing additional, but reasonable, 
limits on discovery.  This rule would better help Oregon realize its 
goals for civil practice—the just, speedy, and inexpensive2 
administration of justice—while remaining true to the value of broad 
discovery. 
This Comment begins by looking at the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure relating to discovery, the purpose and goals of discovery, 
as well as the three primary federal limitations on discovery, with a 
particular emphasis on the Proportionality Rule and its needed 
limitations on discovery, particularly in light of e-discovery.  Next, 
this Comment will examine discovery rules in Oregon, the goals of 
discovery in Oregon, Oregon’s two limitations on discovery, and, 
finally, the conspicuous absence of the Proportionality Rule.  This 
Comment concludes with a call for the Proportionality Rule to be 
adopted in Oregon because it is consistent with both the goals of the 
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP) and the purpose of 
discovery in civil litigation, and, additionally, it is a needed limitation 
given the profound impact e-discovery has and will continue to have 
on litigation in this state. 
 
2 OR. R. CIV. P. 1 B (“These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.”). 
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I 
DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The FRCP define the rules for civil practice in federal courts in this 
country, outlining everything from pleading standards to discovery 
procedures.  Three values are at the core of the FRCP—“the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”3  While only applicable in federal jurisdictions, the 
FRCP are also noteworthy in that many states have used the FRCP as 
the starting point for drafting state rules of civil procedure.4 
The rules for discovery and disclosure, Rules 26 through 37, are 
among the most important rules in the FRCP.  They are important 
because discovery comprises such a large component of litigation, but 
also because these rules help realize the FRCP’s goal of facilitating 
broad discovery.  These rules also provide limits on discovery 
through a few carefully crafted rules limiting discovery. 
A.  The Purpose of Discovery 
Discovery is an integral component of civil litigation.  The 
adoption of the FRCP resulted in a radical change in the general 
framework of civil proceedings in this country, and, in doing so, it 
gave discovery a new importance for civil litigation because the 
FRCP introduced a new, lower pleading standard. 
The civil suit commences with the complaint,5 which is a 
pleading.6  “Pleading standard” describes the minimum level of detail 
in a pleading sufficient for a suit to proceed.  Today, the standard for 
a sufficient pleading is relatively low, a standard often described as 
“notice pleading.”  This is in contrast to the pre-FRCP, “fact 
pleading” standard.  Instead of providing mere notice to opposing 
parties, pleadings were previously the primary means of “issue-
formulation and fact-revelation.”7  As a result, pleadings were 
subjected to a much higher standard in the pre-FRCP civil practice 
 
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
4 FRCP drafters actually had this in mind when drafting the FRCP—that the federal 
rules would provide a “model that the states could adopt, thus fostering national and 
interstate procedural uniformity.”  Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona 
Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 615 (2002). 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
6 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(1). 
7 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). 
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framework because of the depth of facts and theories necessary for a 
suit to proceed. 
Today, the pleading standard is noticeably lessened because 
pleadings are intended to serve a different goal.  A party must merely 
provide a “short and plain statement” that addresses jurisdiction, relief 
sought, and the claim.8  The goal of the pleading, as articulated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”9  Although 
no longer accomplished via pleadings, facts must still be revealed and 
issues narrowed.  With the FRCP, this duty was shifted to the 
discovery phase.  As a result, under the FRCP, discovery assumed a 
new importance to any proceeding. 
It is through discovery that issues are narrowed and facts are 
identified.10  Before the FRCP, because of the higher, “fact” pleading 
standard, this information would have to be known in advance of the 
pleading in order to be included in the pleading.  Reflecting the shift 
to “notice pleading,” the Supreme Court remarked, “[t]he way is now 
clear . . . for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the 
issues and facts before trial.”11  Prior to the adoption of the FRCP, 
judicial proceedings were “a battle of wits.”12  Under the rules, 
proceedings became a search for the truth.13 
 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).  The recent decision of Twombly has raised questions as to 
whether the Supreme Court has raised the standard for pleadings.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).  In Twombly, the Court required that, to sufficiently 
plead a section 1 violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the complaint had to include 
“enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the 
illegal conduct.  Id.  This standard is essentially equivalent to fact pleading.  Much recent 
scholarship has been devoted to whether or not Twombly heightened the pleading standard 
for all federal civil litigation or just for antitrust claims.  The subsequent decision of Iqbal 
addressed this question and appears to apply a heightened standard across the board.  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–51 (2009).  Legal commentators will continue to 
debate the impact of these decisions on the federal pleading standard.  However, the 
language of Rule 8 remains the same.  Even if these decisions do result in a heightened 
pleading standard, the Proportionality Rule is still seen as consistent with the objectives of 
discovery in federal civil litigation. 
9 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
10 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501. 
11 Id. 
12 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 40 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the “sporting theory” 
of justice). 
13 Id. 
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In order to meet this new duty, broad discovery was embraced.14  
Because of the notice pleading standard, parties have an opportunity 
to use discovery to explore the bounds of their cases.  The theory was, 
simply, if the pleading standard was reduced to a notice pleading 
standard, to ensure that parties had adequate opportunity to uncover 
the facts necessary to establish their case, discovery would need to be 
broad after the pleading stage.  As explained by the Supreme Court, 
“[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery 
rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and 
issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”15  To respond to this 
new duty, a series of amended discovery rules were enacted that 
embraced the practice of broad discovery.  Commentators frequently 
cite three main purposes for the FRCP’s liberalized discovery rules: 
“(1) To narrow the issues . . . .  (2) To obtain evidence for use at the 
trial.  (3) To secure information about the existence of evidence that 
may be used at the trial and to ascertain how and from whom it may 
be procured.”16 
Today, broad discovery remains a key value of the FRCP.  Indeed, 
the FRCP articulates a broad scope of discovery in FRCP 26, “any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense,”17 in order to realize this goal.  Discovery now comprises the 
bulk of time spent in litigation and the bulk of expenses incurred in 
the process.18  While broad discovery plays a necessary role in the 
structure of civil proceedings, it is not without limits. 
 
14 Broad discovery is also endorsed in criminal procedure.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
15 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 
16 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 12, § 2001, at 41. 
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  In its entirety, the scope of discovery is: 
 Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and 
the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.  For 
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action.  Relevant information need not be admissible at the 
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.  All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).   
Id. 
18 See generally Moss, supra note 1 (arguing for a new procedural rule that explicitly 
allows discovery post–summary judgment). 
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B.  Federal Limits on Discovery 
Despite the value placed on broad discovery, broad discovery in 
practice is not without criticism.  Because of the potentially expansive 
scope of discovery, conceivably, an attorney can argue that many 
things fall within the scope of discovery and, in so doing, 
unnecessarily delay the process or burden his opponent.  Simply put, 
discovery rules are susceptible to abuse.  Since the mid to late 
seventies, the FRCP’s Advisory Committee has been concerned with 
mitigating the potential for discovery abuse.  The Advisory 
Committee formulated revisions to the FRCP with the goal of 
repairing these weaknesses and strengthening areas in which the rules 
are susceptible to abuse.19 
Today, the FRCP include three primary limitations on discovery at 
the federal level20: the scope of discovery outlined in FRCP 26(b)(1), 
protective orders, and the Proportionality Rule of FRCP 26(b)(2)(C). 
First, the initial hurdle for any discovery request is that it must fall 
within the scope of discovery.  The scope of discovery outlined in 
FRCP 26(b)(1) is quite broad, reaching “any nonprivileged matter that 
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”21  This rule describes 
what is discoverable without any regard for whether the discovered 
information will be admissible at trial.22  FRCP 26(b)(1) was 
amended in 2000 and, as amended, theoretically reduced the scope 
from any matter relevant to the case to any matter that is relevant to 
the claim or defense.  However, Rule 26(b)(1) preserves the former 
scope by permitting, on a showing of good cause, “discovery of any 
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”23  The 
 
19 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 12, § 2001, at 49–50. 
20 While the FRCP outlines limitations as they relate to discovery practices, this is not 
the only attempt to thwart abusive discovery requests.  Under the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, “A lawyer shall not: . . . (d) in pretrial 
procedure, make a frivolous discovery request . . . .”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 3.4(d) (2003).  Conceivably, the situations enumerated in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) would 
qualify as frivolous.  This rule could subject an attorney to discipline for such discovery 
requests.  However, the two approaches differ in that the Model Rules look to the conduct 
of the attorney rather than the discovery practices as a whole.  Oddly, the FRCP excludes 
the discovery and disclosure rules, including Rule 26, from FRCP 11 sanctions for making 
a representation to the court that is “presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass, 
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
11(b)(1), (d). 
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
22 Id. (“Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
23 Id. 
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2000 amendment, which made the wider “relevant to the subject 
matter” scope of discovery available only on a showing of good 
cause, reflects the growing recognition that discovery can and should 
be subject to some limitations and that such limitations are consistent 
with the value of broad discovery.24  In doing so, the Advisory 
Committee showed its willingness to reign in discovery to guard 
against potential abuse. 
Second, protective orders also limit discovery.  Prior to the 
adoption of the Proportionality Rule, protective orders were the only 
substantial mechanism to limit discovery.  Under FRCP 26(c), 
protective orders may protect “a party . . . from whom discovery is 
sought” from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense.”25  When a protective order is issued, the 
discovery is limited by placing someone or something effectively off 
limits from the discovery process. 
C.  The Proportionality Rule 
A relatively recent addition to the FRCP, the Proportionality Rule, 
FRCP 26(b)(2)(C), is the third key limitation on discovery in the 
FRCP.  FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) outlines situations in which discovery must 
be limited: 
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or 
extent of discovery otherwise allowed . . . if it determines that: (i) 
the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or 
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, 
less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery 
has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in 
the action; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues.26 
There are three noteworthy components to this rule.  First, if the 
discovery fits within the enumerated categories, discovery must be 
limited; it is not a permissive rule.  Second, the Proportionality Rule 
can be invoked by either a party on motion or by the court on its own 
 
24 See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a 
Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1215–16 (2005) (discussing what the amendment means in practice). 
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
NICHOLLS 5/18/2011  12:56 PM 
2011] A Proportional Response 1453 
initiative.  This rule enables the court to act as a check on discovery 
practices, an additional protection against potentially abusive 
discovery practices.  Finally, this rule requires the court to engage in a 
cost-benefit analysis of the discovery.  Such a limitation reflects an 
attempt to reform discovery practices to, as one commentator 
described, “contain the genie of broad discovery without killing it.”27  
Most importantly, the Proportionality Rule helps to realize the 
FRCP’s goal of “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”28 
In practice, the party requesting discovery bears the initial burden 
of showing that the discovery is relevant under FRCP 26(b)(1).  Then, 
the burden shifts to the party opposing discovery to show that the 
discovery is improper under the Proportionality Rule and its 
limitations as outlined in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C).29 
The seeds of the Proportionality Rule were planted in 1983 with an 
amendment to then FRCP 26(b).30  This amendment attempted “to 
promote judicial limitation of the amount of discovery on a case-by-
case basis to avoid abuse or overuse of discovery through the concept 
of proportionality.”31  No longer were protective orders (i.e., FRCP 
26(c)) the only route to limit discovery.  Instead, the parties, as well 
as the court, had an additional tool to limit discovery.  As the 
Advisory Committee noted, “[t]he objective [of FRCP 26(b)(1)] is to 
guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the 
court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be 
directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.”32  In 
this sense, the Proportionality Rule has the narrow goal of reigning in 
irrelevant discovery—not denying the value of broad discovery. 
The Proportionality Rule functions as a limitation applicable to all 
discovery.  “[C]ommentators have characterized [this rule] as a 
radical departure from the free and easy days of liberal discovery.”33  
The Advisory Committee addressed this argument, that the 
 
27 Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 747 (1998). 
28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
29 Sadofsky v. Fiesta Prods., LLC, 252 F.R.D. 143, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
30 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 12, § 2008.1, at 117. 
31 Id. 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s notes (1983). 
33 Patricia Groot, Electronically Stored Information: Balancing Free Discovery with 
Limits on Abuse, 2009 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, ¶ 10 (2009) (quoting Henry S. Noyes, 
Good Cause is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 
56 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Proportionality Rule denies parties broad discovery, and explicitly 
rejected it.  In fact, as the 1983 Advisory Committee noted, “[t]he 
grounds mentioned in the amended rule for limiting discovery [i.e., 
the Proportionality Rule] reflect the existing practice of many courts 
in issuing protective orders under Rule 26(c).”34  As described by 
Federal Practice and Procedure, “[i]n general, it seems that the three 
provisions of the amended [Rule 26(b)(1)] should not be treated as 
separate and discrete grounds to limit discovery so much as indicia of 
proper use of discovery mechanisms . . . .”35 
The Proportionality Rule recognizes that some discovery is not 
worth the resulting burden.  Particularly at a time when discovery is 
often the most laborious and expensive element of litigation, it is not 
difficult to imagine situations in which the expenditure of time or 
money is simply not justified.  The Proportionality Rule guards 
against the proverbial “fishing expedition” that can occur in discovery 
by imposing a reasonable, but not prohibitive, limit on discovery.  As 
described by one court, “[w]hen a plaintiff first pleads its allegations 
in entirely indefinite terms, without in fact knowing of any specific 
wrongdoing by the defendant, and then bases massive discovery 
requests upon those nebulous allegations, in the hope of finding 
particular evidence of wrongdoing, that plaintiff abuses the judicial 
process.”36  The Proportionality Rule guards against abuses of the 
process; it does not deny relevant discovery to a party. 
The Proportionality Rule is not, however, without critics.  It does 
require the judge to weigh the potential evidentiary benefit against the 
resulting burden, which may administratively be a difficult task.37  It 
also results in limiting discovery, which, on its face, runs contrary to 
the value of broad discovery in this country.  In the words of one 
critic, “[a]lthough denying relevant discovery due to cost may be 
defensible pragmatically, it is an unsatisfying concession that 
litigation accuracy inevitably is limited due to the cost of finding and 
analyzing evidence needed for accurate verdicts or settlements.”38 
In practice, the Proportionality Rule has not unjustifiably limited 
discovery.  By many measures, the rule is underutilized.  In fact, the 
 
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s notes (1983). 
35 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 12, § 2008.1, at 119. 
36 Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1238 (10th Cir. 2000). 
37 See Moss, supra note 1, at 899–904 (criticizing the administerability of the 
Proportionality Rule). 
38 Id. at 907. 
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2000 amendment of Rule 26(b)(1) (scope of discovery) included a 
cross-reference to FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) to remind practitioners and 
courts that the scope of discovery like “[a]ll discovery is subject to the 
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”39 
The Proportionality Rule has effectively guarded against fishing 
expeditions.  For example, in those cases in which the rule was 
invoked, discovery was limited because the discovery could not be 
justified given the cost-benefit analysis.  For example, in Tolliver the 
Western Michigan U.S. District Court upheld discovery limitations 
imposed by the magistrate judge.40  The district court held that the 
discovery requests were nothing more than examples of 
overdiscovery, which the party had hoped would yield admissible 
evidence.41  The burden on the party from whom discovery was 
sought outweighed the value of the potential evidence.42 
On other occasions, FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) has been used to limit 
discovery in one of the situations expressly outlined in the rule.  In 
Green Construction Co., the U.S. District Court of Kansas held that a 
discovery request was unduly burdensome under the terms of FRCP 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).43  That case involved a discovery request for all bond 
claims filed against the plaintiff since 1983, which totaled over 
62,000 claims.44  Because fulfilling the discovery request would have 
required each bond to be inspected individually, even though the 
results may have yielded relevant evidence, the court held the request 
placed a burden on the plaintiff that could not be justified by any 
resulting relevant evidence.45 
Some abuses of the discovery process are so egregious that the 
court must intervene to limit discovery in the interest of justice.46  In 
Roberts, Judge Naythons discussed not only the abuse of discovery 
that occurred at the hands of the plaintiff but also the impact of 
 
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
40 Tolliver v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 265 F. Supp. 2d 873, 880 (W.D. Mich. 2003). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Green Constr. Co. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 732 F. Supp. 1550, 1554 (D. Kan. 
1990).  The court in Green Construction Co. actually made this ruling under then FRCP 
26(b)(1)(ii), but that rule has been restyled as FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); the content of the 
rules is identical. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Roberts v. Lyons, 131 F.R.D. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
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overdiscovery.47  He acknowledged that overdiscovery, known as a 
“fishing expedition,” is a common practice in litigation.48  As a result, 
the plaintiff’s conduct, because of the cost associated with 
overdiscovery, “may well force the [defendant] City of Philadelphia, 
lacking in sufficient funds, to accept an unfair settlement, or force 
settlement of an unmeritorious claim.”49  The judge found the 
plaintiff’s requests to be repetitive and indifferent to either costs or 
alternative sources of information.50 
Failure to utilize alternative sources of information instead of 
discovery, particularly publicly available sources, can result in 
discovery limitations.51  The court in Public Service Enterprise 
Group found that the plaintiff’s discovery request seeking information 
about power outages was already publicly available because of 
previous litigation and public records.52  As a result, the court held 
that these requests were in violation of the Proportionality Rule even 
though the information requested yielded information relevant to the 
action.53  Using alternative, publicly available sources is a very 
efficient method of discovery, one encouraged by FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) 
because costs are often negligible and little resulting burden is placed 
on the opposing party. 
These cases illustrate the potential abuses of discovery that can 
occur when broad discovery is permitted to run wild.  However, these 
cases also illustrate how the FRCP can continue to value broad 
discovery while guarding against discovery practices that are likely to 
accomplish little more than expend resources and delay litigation. 
The Proportionality Rule will likely be of greater importance in the 
years to come, particularly as e-discovery becomes a larger 
component of discovery.  Because the nature of e-discovery differs 
from that of traditional discovery, and because the impact of e-
discovery is potentially enormous, the additional, carefully crafted 
limitations of the Proportionality Rule will likely ensure that 
discovery remains a necessary, useful tool. 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See Pub. Serv. Enter. Grp., Inc. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 130 F.R.D. 543 (D. N.J. 1990). 
52 Id. at 551. 
53 Id. 
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D.  E-Discovery: A Case Study in Potentially Explosive Discovery 
It is stating the obvious to say that technology has radically 
changed our lives, how we engage with the world, and how business 
is conducted.54  For example, it is estimated that ninety percent of 
corporate data is digital.55  As one commentator noted, “[t]his 
increasing prevalence of electronics in business, government, and 
individual settings has led to a significant increase in electronically 
stored information (ESI).”56  ESI includes all “information that is 
stored electronically.”57 
E-discovery is a growing component of discovery.  In fact, as 
described by experts, “[t]he aspect of law that is perhaps most 
impacted by ESI is discovery . . . .”58  It is widely accepted that e-
discovery will become an increasingly larger component of the 
discovery process, a process that is already the most expensive and, 
arguably, the most labor intensive portion of litigation.  E-discovery 
has and will continue to have a huge impact on discovery, and 
discovery must adapt to this changing landscape.  To quote one 
district court judge, “as individuals and corporations increasingly do 
business electronically . . . the universe of discoverable materials has 
expanded exponentially.”59  As this “universe” increases, the 
potential for abusive discovery practices is only going to increase.  “It 
is hard to overstate the importance and the degree of anxiety 
generated by electronic discovery . . . .”60 
The impact of e-discovery on litigation is not confined to the 
volume of potentially discoverable information.  There are also 
fundamental differences between e-discovery and traditional 
discovery that affect how discovery is conducted.  The Judicial 
Conference Committee pointed to three key differences: 
 
54 See generally Leroy J. Tornquist & Christine R. Olson, A Last Vestige of Oregon’s 
Wild West: Oregon’s Lawless Approach to Electronically Stored Information, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 161, 161–62 (2008) (discussing the increased use of technology in 
the legal practice). 
55 Moss, supra note 1, at 893. 
56 Tornquist & Olson, supra note 54, at 162. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 162–63 (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2003). 
60 Moss, supra note 1, at 894 (quoting Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic 
Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (comments of 
Rosenthal, J., S.D. Tex.)). 
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[ESI] is characterized by exponentially greater volume than hard-
copy documents.  . . .  Computer information, unlike paper, is also 
dynamic; merely turning a computer on or off can change the 
information it stores.  . . .  A third important difference is that [ESI], 
unlike words on paper, may be incomprehensible when separated 
from the system that created it.61 
The FRCP have acknowledged these distinctions, as well as the 
radical impact on discovery that e-discovery can have, and has taken 
steps to address discovery in the ESI context by enacting amendments 
to the FRCP that specifically address e-discovery.62  But even these 
limitations are still subject to the Proportionality Rule.  For example, 
FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) addresses specific limitations on discovery of ESI.  
Rule 34 addresses how ESI can be produced. 
While e-discovery and ESI-specific rules limit discovery, the 
Proportionality Rule does, too.  In addition to the e-discovery-specific 
rules, the Proportionality Rule can also help to mitigate the impact of 
e-discovery on litigation.  FRCP 26(b)(2)(B), in its second-to-last 
sentence, specifically invokes the mandatory limits on discovery 
imposed by the Proportionality Rule.63  While FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) 
takes a positive step in this mitigation effort, the Proportionality Rule 
effectively adds another layer of protection against abusive discovery 
in the e-discovery context.  In fact, the Sedona Conference, in its Best 
Practices for e-discovery, specifically cited the Proportionality Rule 
as providing the best framework through which to conduct the cost-
benefit analysis for ESI in e-discovery.64 
 
61 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY 
OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 22–23 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts 
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf.  The Committee, as justification, cited 
these three key differences for the ESI and e-discovery-specific amendments to the FRCP 
in 2006. 
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of 
electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.  On motion to compel discovery or for a 
protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information 
is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.  If that showing is made, the 
court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows 
good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) [i.e., the Proportionality Rule].  
The court may specify conditions for the discovery.”); Groot, supra note 33 (arguing that 
all discovery should be subject to the same rules). 
63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
64 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION 17–18 (2nd ed. 2007), available at www.thesedonaconference.org/content 
/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf. 
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The FRCP continues to value broad discovery, a value and practice 
necessary because the FRCP uses a notice pleading standard.  Given 
the necessities of broad discovery, limitations on discovery in the 
FRCP are few and far between.  However, it is not inconsistent with 
the goals of broad discovery to limit discovery in certain situations, 
such as those enumerated in the Proportionality Rule.  The terms of 
the Proportionality Rule, in addition to other recent e-discovery-
specific FRCP amendments, will likely become especially important 
in the coming years as e-discovery becomes a larger and more 
laborious part of the discovery process. 
II 
DISCOVERY UNDER THE OREGON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
As the FRCP governs federal procedure, civil practice in Oregon, 
including discovery, is governed by the ORCP.  Similar to its federal 
counterpart, the ORCP are used to realize the “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.”65  Efficient litigation and 
cost-effective litigation, as the language of ORCP 1 B indicates, are 
primary goals of the ORCP and values of civil litigation in Oregon.  
By incorporating the federal Proportionality Rule into the ORCP and 
offering an additional limitation on discovery, Oregon could better 
realize these goals. 
A.  Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure—The Background 
Prior to the enactment of the ORCP, Oregon civil practice was 
governed by statute.  Little in terms of the substance of the rules for 
civil procedure, however, changed when Oregon moved from statute 
to a collection of civil procedure rules.  The text of the ORCP was 
based on both the FRCP and existing Oregon practices, which were 
often codified in the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS). 
The ORCP were adopted in 1977 and took effect in 1980 after the 
Oregon Legislature found that uniform rules of civil procedure were 
needed in the State “to assure prompt and efficient administration of 
justice in the courts of the state.”66  The Legislature created the 
Council on Court Procedures (“the Council”) to develop, study, and 
 
65 OR. R. CIV. P. 1 B; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  The ORCP formulation is identical to 
the federal formulation, except that the FRCP’s scope and purpose includes the language 
“of every action and proceeding.”  The Oregon equivalent reads only “of every action.” 
66 OR. REV. STAT. § 1.725(1) (2009). 
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periodically review the system of civil procedure rules.67  Although 
the Council drafts the rules and subsequent amendments, the Oregon 
Legislature ultimately votes to adopt the rules. 
The Council often looks to recent FRCP amendments as an 
indication of trends in civil procedure, as well as developments and 
issues unique to the Oregon Bar.  As part of the Council’s periodic 
review of the ORCP, however, discovery procedures are rarely 
considered.68  Despite being so integral to civil practice, discovery 
rules in Oregon have remained largely unchanged from the initial 
1977 ORCP and largely untouched by the Council’s subsequent 
deliberations. 
Oregon rules of discovery, like many provisions of the ORCP, 
parallel those found in the FRCP.  Mirroring federal civil practice was 
a goal of the Council in adopting the ORCP, and fostering uniformity 
in state and federal courts was a goal behind the FRCP.69  Of course, 
while the ORCP was enacted in 1977, the FRCP was enacted some 
forty years prior.  Oregon’s practice of mirroring federal civil practice 
rules actually predated the adoption of the ORCP.  When initially 
deliberating over the adoption and contents of the ORCP, the Council 
acknowledged that Oregon had incorporated federal discovery rules 
via statute, albeit in a “piecemeal” fashion, from 1955 on.70  For 
example, statutorily, Oregon “modified [its scope of discovery] to 
conform with the Federal scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1)”71 
 
67 Id. § 1.725(2)–(4).  The ORS outlines the procedure for adopting and modifying the 
ORCP, as well as the purpose behind the ORCP.  See id. §§ 1.725–1.760.  The Council 
consists of an Oregon Supreme Court justice, an Oregon Court of Appeals judge, eight 
circuit court judges, twelve members of the Oregon State Bar, and one member of the 
public.  Id. § 1.730(1).  Under the procedures outlined in the ORS, the Council drafts the 
rules, as well as subsequent amendments, which are then submitted to the Oregon 
Legislature for adoption.  The rules and amendments automatically take effect under ORS 
1.735 unless the Legislature takes contrary action such as amending or rejecting the 
proposed rules.  Id. § 1.735(1).  Enacted rules are then published in the ORS.  Id. § 1.750. 
68 See generally 1 OREGON COUNCIL ON COURT PROCEDURES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
MATERIALS (1977-1979 biennium) (not paginated) (containing a dearth of discussions 
about discovery procedures). 
69 See Tobias, supra note 4, at 615. 
70 Memorandum from Fred Merrill to Council on Court Procedures (Apr. 26, 1978), in 
3 OREGON COUNCIL ON COURT PROCEDURES, supra note 68. 
71 Minutes of Meeting of Council on Court Procedures, Sheraton Hotel, Portland, Or. 
(Feb. 18, 1978), in 1 OREGON COUNCIL ON COURT PROCEDURES, supra note 68.  At the 
meeting, the Council discussed areas where Oregon differed from the FRCP, including the 
use of interrogatories.  Id. at 1–2; see also Memorandum from Fred Merrill, supra note 70, 
at 2–6 (contrasting the federal rule with the ABA’s recommendations, ultimately adopting 
the federal perspective, and noting that both embrace broad discovery rules). 
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before the ORCP were adopted; that scope was subsequently 
incorporated into ORCP 1 B. 
During the initial drafting of the ORCP, the Council engaged in 
prolonged discussions about the ORCP’s purpose, scope, and content 
before drafting and submitting rules to the Legislature.72  However, 
regarding discovery, the only discovery-related rules that received 
any substantive discussion were rules regarding interrogatories and 
the discovery of experts.73  Outside of interrogatories and experts, 
Oregon largely adopted the FRCP’s approach to discovery in content 
as well as theory.  Today, interrogatories and discovery of experts are 
the two primary distinctions between the ORCP and FRCP. 
While many states looked to the FRCP when initially crafting their 
own state rules of civil procedure, states have, in recent years, 
distanced themselves from the practice of mirroring the federal 
procedures at the state level.  In recent years, many states have broke 
with this tradition to establish state-grown approaches and rules to 
civil procedure.74  This explains why, in part, Oregon’s rules may not 
correlate to the FRCP; a state is free to develop different rules.  
Nonetheless, Oregon’s rules were based on federal rules, embodying 
a similar set of values.  While Oregon is free to chart its own course, 
the amendments to the FRCP, including the Proportionality Rule, 
should be at least persuasive to the Council. 
B.  Discovery Limitations Under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure 
As noted previously, the ORCP discovery rules largely paralleled 
both the existing Oregon practice and the FRCP.  For example, 
Oregon embraced the FRCP’s use of broad discovery.75  As with the 
federal system, Oregon relies on discovery to be a primary 
mechanism for issue formulation and information gathering.  
However, as discussed regarding federal discovery practices, broad 
 
72 See supra note 67 (discussing the process for adopting and amending the ORCP). 
73 Memoranda on Interrogatories and Discovery of Experts, in 2 OREGON COUNCIL ON 
COURT PROCEDURES, supra note 68.  Today, the absence of interrogatories and rules 
regarding expert witnesses remain the two primary areas in which the ORCP diverge from 
the FRCP model.  See Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or. 392, 402–05, 84 P.3d 140, 145–47 
(2004) (en banc) (discussing Oregon’s approach to discovery of experts).  Oregon’s rule 
regarding discovery of expert testimony is grounded in ORCP 36 B(1), in that experts are 
beyond the intended scope of discovery.  Id. at 404–05, 147. 
74 See Koppel, supra note 24, at 1171–74. 
75 See, e.g., Vaughan v. Taylor, 79 Or. App. 359, 364–65 & n.7, 718 P.2d 1387, 1390–
91 (1986) (discussing the need for broad discovery, rather than admissibility, as the 
standard and citing with favor discussion of federal discovery practices and goals). 
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discovery practices invite the criticism that such practices are 
susceptible to abuse.  The Council considered this criticism, but 
concluded that “[a]busive and useless discovery is wrong, but this is 
better controlled either by limiting the discovery devices or court 
control under the general protective provisions of the discovery 
rule.”76 
While Oregon uses discovery in a similar fashion, Oregon’s 
pleading standard is higher than the federal standard of “notice 
pleading.”  Oregon has adopted a “fact pleading” standard, which 
requires that a pleading include a “plain and concise statement of the 
ultimate facts constituting a claim for relief without unnecessary 
repetition.”77  Oregon courts have routinely recognized that this 
pleading standard differs from the federal pleading standard and that 
it is, effectively, a heightened standard.78  The Oregon standard is 
higher because a pleading must include sufficient facts to state the 
ultimate claim, whereas the federal standard merely requires a concise 
statement of the claim without addressing the ultimate facts.  A 
sufficient pleading in Oregon must include a “fairly specific 
description of facts as opposed to adopting the less specific fact 
description allowable in federal courts [under the ‘notice pleading 
standard’].”79  Despite this distinction, however, discovery plays a 
similar role; discovery is still an integral component of litigation 
because, even though the pleading standard is higher, discovery is still 
crucial for civil litigation to narrow issues and identify facts.  
However, because of the higher burden that must be met by the 
pleading (that facts must be included in the pleading in practice), the 
role of discovery is slightly different.  This distinction impacts the 
role discovery must play and, as will be discussed, the limitations that 
can be placed on discovery without jeopardizing that role. 
 
76 Discovery, in 3 OREGON COUNCIL ON COURT PROCEDURES, supra note 68. 
77 OR. R. CIV. P. 18 A.  Prior to the adoption of the ORCP, Oregon actually had a 
pleading standard more akin to the federal notice pleading standard.  See Moore v. Willis, 
307 Or. 254, 258, 767 P.2d 62, 64 (1988) (discussing the impact of the ORCP language on 
pleading standards in Oregon). 
78 See Davis v. Tyee Indus., Inc., 295 Or. 467, 472, 476, 668 P.2d 1186, 1189, 1192 
(1983) (discussing the difference between federal and Oregon assumpsit pleading 
standards); see also Welch v. Bancorp Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., 296 Or. 208, 221, 675 P.2d 
172, 180 (1983) (evaluating the federal and state pleading standards and electing to retain 
Oregon’s fact pleading standard despite federal use of “notice pleading”). 
79 Davis, 295 Or. at 476, 668 P.2d at 1192 (quoting OR. R. CIV. P. 18 advisory 
committee’s comment). 
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C.  Discovery Limitations Under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure 
There are two limitations on discovery included in the ORCP80—
the scope of discovery and protective orders.  Both of these 
limitations have federal counterparts, but the third federal method of 
limiting discovery, the Proportionality Rule, is absent from the 
ORCP.  Oregon could benefit from the inclusion of an additional 
limit, one like the Proportionality Rule, particularly given the 
expected impact of e-discovery in Oregon. 
1.  The Scope of Discovery Under the Oregon Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
As required by the FRCP, to be discoverable, the requested 
discovery must fall within the scope of discovery.  In Oregon, the rule 
is drafted equally broadly: “For all forms of discovery, parties may 
inquire regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or 
defense of any other party . . . .”81  As noted above, Oregon adopted 
this standard statutorily, with the intent of “conform[ing] with the 
Federal scope of discovery” before incorporating this standard into 
the ORCP. 82 
 
80 However, discovery limitations are not confined to the ORCP.  As with the ABA’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see supra note 20, the Oregon Rules of Professional 
Conduct outline the rules relating to how attorneys practice law in Oregon.  The Oregon 
Rules of Professional Conduct provide that an attorney is not to, “in pretrial procedure, 
knowingly make a frivolous discovery request.”  OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3.4(d).  This language is identical to the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct went into effect in Oregon in January 2005.  
However, a review of the Disciplinary Board Reporter reveals that no attorney has been 
disciplined under this rule.  While it is arguable that this is because no attorney has 
violated the rules, it is also arguable that, despite attorneys acting contrary to this rule, a 
complaint has not been filed.  Because this rule sanctions conduct only after it has 
occurred, after the frivolous discovery request has been submitted, it is unlikely that this 
rule alone can end abusive discovery requests. 
81 OR. R. CIV. P. 36 B(1).  As with the FRCP scope of discovery, the test is not ultimate 
admissibility of the discovery but merely its relationship to the claim or defense of the 
parties. 
82 Minutes of Meeting of Council on Court Procedures, supra note 71, at 1.  At the 
meeting, the Council discussed areas where Oregon differed from the FRCP, including the 
use of interrogatories.  Id. at 1–2; see also Discovery, supra note 76, at 2–6. 
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The scope of discovery under the ORCP is very broad.  This is by 
design, because broad discovery is intended to meet the goals of 
allowing parties to fully develop their cases.83 
2.  Protective Orders Under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure 
The ORCP relies primarily on protective orders to curb potentially 
abusive discovery practices.  This was the intent of the Council in 
adopting the ORCP and reflected the state of discovery in Oregon 
prior to the ORCP.  This was the practice in Oregon, as codified in the 
ORS, in advance of the ORCP.84 
The ORCP approach to protective orders incorporated existing 
ORS 41.63185 and 41.618,86 as well as federal rules.87  As noted by 
 
83 See Vaughn v. Taylor, 79 Or. App. 359, 365 & n.7, 718 P.2d 1387, 1391 & n.7 
(1986) (quoting 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 12, § 2001) (implicitly 
endorsing the federal standard of broad discovery). 
84 Discovery, supra note 76, at 10–11. 
85 The text read as follows: 
(1) Upon motion by a party, and for good cause shown, the court in which the 
action, suit or proceeding is pending may make any order which justice requires 
to protect a party or a witness upon whom a request for any type of discovery has 
been made from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or 
expense, including one or more of the following: 
(a) That the discovery not be had; 
(b) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, 
including a designation of the time or place;  
(c) That the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than 
that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(d) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(e) That discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(f) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a 
designated way; 
(g) That the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
inclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or 
(h) That to prevent hardship the party requesting discovery pay to the other 
party reasonable expenses incurred in attending the deposition or otherwise 
responding to the request for discovery. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 41.631 (repealed 1979). 
86 The text read as follows:  
(1) Upon motion by a party, and for good cause shown, the court in which the 
action, suit or proceeding is pending may make any order which justice requires 
to protect a party upon whom a request for any type of discovery has been made 
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the Council, the only substantive difference between the pre-ORCP 
protective orders (ORS 41.631 and 41.618) and FRCP 26(c) 
protective orders was that the former did not permit a nonparty to 
seek a protective order, whereas the federal rule permits nonparties 
from whom discovery was requested to seek a protective order.88  The 
Council opted to adopt the FRCP protective order approach, 
permitting nonparties to seek a protective order, rejecting the Oregon 
route.89 
That the Council elected to adopt the federal approach is 
noteworthy in that it reflects the Council’s willingness and even 
desire to bring Oregon rules in line with federal rules, as well as the 
Council’s willingness to adopt additional limitations on discovery.90  
It makes sense that in 1977 the Council would rely primarily on 
 
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense, 
including one or more of the following: 
(a) That the discovery not be had; 
(b) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, 
including a designation of the time or place; 
(c) That the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than 
that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(d) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(e) That discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(f) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a 
designated way; 
(g) That the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
inclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or 
(h) That to prevent hardship the party requesting discovery pay the other 
party reasonable expenses incurred in attending the deposition or otherwise 
responding to the request for discovery. 
Id. § 41.618 (repealed 1979). 
87 These rules regarding protective orders are largely similar in scope and text.  The 
Counsel noted this overlap and attributed it to lobbying strategy.  Discovery, supra note 
76, at 10.  The adoption of the ORCP, resulting in the incorporation of these protective 
order rules, led to both statutory provisions being repealed by the Legislature. 
88 Memorandum from Fred Merrill, supra note 70, at 4. 
89 Id.  Another key difference is that ORCP 36 C(9) does not appear in FRCP 36(c).  
Compare OR. R. CIV. P. 36 C(9) with FED. R. CIV. P. 36(c)(1). 
90 Allowing nonparties to pursue protective orders can be seen as a broader limitation 
on discovery in that protective orders are available to a potentially larger group (i.e., 
nonparties as well as parties).  Plus, by making protective orders available to nonparties, 
the court can consider the impact of discovery requests on a larger group when deciding 
whether or not to limit discovery. 
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protective orders to limit discovery; other than the scope of discovery, 
protective orders were the only discovery limitations in place in the 
FRCP in 1977.  The FRCP has, in recent years, added additional 
limitations on discovery to its arsenal of tools guarding against 
abusive discovery practices.  Protective orders, however, remain the 
primary limitation on discovery in Oregon. 
ORCP 36 C,91 by its own terms, vests discretion in the court, once 
the good cause standard is met, to craft a protective order to ensure 
that justice is done given the facts of the case.92  Oregon appellate 
courts grant great deference to a trial court’s decision to issue or deny 
a protective order, employing an abuse of discretion level of review.93 
Protective orders can be an effective tool for limiting abusive 
discovery practices in Oregon.  For example, in Citizens’ Utility 
Board, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld a protective order issued 
to the defendant at trial.94  At issue was a study conducted by the 
defendant of its telephone service costs.  The court concluded that the 
defendant’s investment in the study, the confidential nature of the 
 
91 ORCP 36 C today provides,  
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for 
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more 
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be 
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or 
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be 
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) 
that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by 
the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated 
way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information 
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or (9) that to 
prevent hardship the party requesting discovery pay to the other party reasonable 
expenses incurred in attending the deposition or otherwise responding to the 
request for discovery. 
92 See Carton v. Shisler, 146 Or. App. 513, 516, 934 P.2d 448, 450 (1997) (“[U]nder the 
plain language of [ORCP 36 C], once a court concludes that a party or person is entitled to 
a protective order, it has the authority to protect that party or person in any way that justice 
requires.”). 
93 See Farmers Ins. Grp. of Or. v. Hansen, 46 Or. App. 377, 380, 611 P.2d 696, 698 
(1980). 
94 Citizens’ Util. Bd. of Or. v. Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 128 Or. App. 650, 656–57, 877 
P.2d 116, 120–21 (1994). 
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study, and the competitive impact the defendant would suffer if the 
study became public entitled the defendant to a protective order. 
ORCP 36 C differs from its federal analog (FRCP 26(c)) in one 
substantial regard: the text of ORCP 36 C(9), which allows for the 
party requesting discovery to pay for such discovery if the request 
would otherwise be a hardship for the party providing discovery.  
This language reflects the Council’s recognition of the potential 
astronomical costs that can be incurred in litigation and provides for 
the expense to be shifted to the party requesting discovery as a 
condition of obtaining that discovery.  Ensuring that litigation costs 
remain manageable is a continued concern for the Council.95  Plus, it 
is an explicit goal of the ORCP as articulated in ORCP 1 B.96 
Over time, as discussed above, new rules have been incorporated 
into the FRCP to curb potentially abusive discovery practices—most 
notably, for the purposes of this Comment, the Proportionality Rule.  
However, a review of the Council’s proceedings discussing potential 
amendments to the ORCP reveals that subsequent FRCP amendments 
relating to discovery, including the Proportionality Rule, have not 
entered into the Council’s deliberations.97  Even ORCP 36 C 
(protective orders) receives negligible attention from the Council in 
deliberations. 
The federal Proportionality Rule of FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) is 
conspicuously absent from the ORCP.  This is conspicuous in that the 
absence is arguably contrary to the ORCP and Council’s interest in 
efficient and cost-effective litigation.98  The dearth of Council 
discussion about discovery practices in Oregon generally is also 
noteworthy given how integral discovery is to the system of civil 
litigation in Oregon.  In Oregon today, practitioners must continue to 
rely on protective orders under ORCP 36 C to limit discovery.  
Oregon courts could greatly benefit and better realize their goals of 
administering justice by incorporating the federal Proportionality 
Rule into the ORCP. 
 
95 See Letter from Joe D. Bailey, Chairman, Council on Court Procedures, to John 
Kitzhaber, President of the Senate, and Vera Katz, Speaker of the House 2 (Jan. 2, 1987), 
in 1 OREGON COUNCIL ON COURT PROCEDURES, supra note 68. 
96 See OR. R. CIV. P. 1 B. 
97 See generally 3 OREGON COUNCIL ON COURT PROCEDURES, supra note 68. 
98 See OR. R. CIV. P. 1 B. 
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3.  Specific E-Discovery Limitations in Oregon 
Unlike the FRCP, the ORCP has yet to address e-discovery.99  This 
potentially places Oregon in a precarious position as the cost and 
expense associated with e-discovery is expected to increase, and e-
discovery is expected to become a larger and larger component of 
discoverable information.  As one Oregon scholar noted, “despite the 
FRCP amendments and multiple sets of guidelines produced by 
several organizations, the [ORCP] remain unchanged.  . . .  Oregon 
has remained on the sidelines, taking no steps to amend its civil 
procedure rules . . . .”100 
As discussed above, e-discovery, by virtue of the mass of ESI that 
can be discovered, has the power to result in great burdens for civil 
litigation in this country.  Oregon is particularly vulnerable because 
the state, through the ORCP, has not taken account of the myriad of 
ways in which e-discovery presents unique challenges to 
discovery.101 
III 
A CALL FOR PROPORTIONALITY IN OREGON 
The ORCP’s discovery rules remain largely unchanged since they 
were first adopted over thirty years ago.  In the intervening years, 
much has changed about discovery and litigation generally.  The 
Council should reevaluate the discovery rules, particularly in light of 
the recent FRCP amendments, and incorporate the Proportionality 
Rule into the ORCP.  The Proportionality Rule would offer Oregon 
judges and parties to litigation an additional means by which to guard 
against abusive discovery practices.  There are three primary reasons 
why the Proportionality Rule will be of benefit to Oregon.  First, the 
Proportionality Rule comports with the goals of the ORCP and will 
help ensure these goals are better realized.  Second, the rule comports 
with the use of discovery in Oregon, even though it is, theoretically, a 
narrowing of discovery.  Third, and finally, the rule will help ensure 
that the growing use of e-discovery is not permitted to hijack the 
litigation process, ensuring the discovery process is not unnecessarily 
 
99 See Tornquist & Olsen, supra note 54, at 167–68 (discussing the Council’s discussion 
of e-discovery but noting that no amendment to the ORCP resulted from such discussions). 
100 Id. at 164. 
101 See generally id. (advocating for Oregon to amend the ORCP to more specifically 
provide for the treatment of ESI and e-discovery). 
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susceptible to potential abuses through e-discovery requests and 
practice. 
A.  The Proportionality Rule Comports with Oregon’s Civil 
Procedure Goals 
The Proportionality Rule explicitly outlines limits on discovery 
that do not exist under the ORCP.  For example, under the 
Proportionality Rule, discovery can be denied if requests are 
duplicative or cumulative.  Or discovery can be limited if the 
requested information is otherwise available to the requesting party.  
In a system that is susceptible to overdiscovery, it is not difficult to 
imagine scenarios where discovery requests are duplicative, are 
cumulative, or involve information that can otherwise be obtained.  
However, these discovery limitations are available in Oregon only if 
they also qualify under the grounds for issuing a protective order such 
as annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense. 
There may be overlap between what would be excluded under the 
Proportionality Rule and Oregon’s protective order rule (ORCP 36 
C).  For example, ORCP 36 C addresses the burden of expense.  This 
is also a situation directly addressed by the Federal Proportionality 
Rule.  However, there are many situations that fall outside of the 
scope of ORCP 36 C but are addressed by the Proportionality Rule.  If 
a request falls within the enumerated categories of the Proportionality 
Rule but fails to meet the protective order requirements, there is no 
mechanism in the ORCP to prevent against overdiscovery.  This 
leaves parties and nonparties open to overdiscovery, an abusive 
discovery practice that is counter to the express goals of the ORCP. 
The very first rule of the ORCP lists the goals of the ORCP—just, 
speedy, and cost-effective administration of justice.102  The 
Proportionality Rule reflects and helps realize these goals.  First, it 
facilitates the just administration of justice because it protects parties 
from falling victim to burdensome discovery requests that yield little 
value to the litigation at hand.  For example, as discussed in Roberts, 
the discovery requests at issue, because of the burdensome scope, 
could force the City of Philadelphia into an unjust settlement simply 
because it lacked the resources to comply fully with the request.  The 
Proportionality Rule in that case successfully blocked these discovery 
requests, even though they fell within the scope of discovery, helping 
 
102 See OR. R. CIV. P. 1 B. 
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yield a just result in the case.  Additionally, because the 
Proportionality Rule explicitly enumerates grounds upon which 
discovery must be limited, it is administrable.103 
Second, the Proportionality Rule facilitates speedy and efficient 
adjudication.  The Proportionality Rule is available both to the parties 
on motion and to the judge at his own election.  Judges in Oregon 
civil courtrooms do not enjoy any discretion comparable to their 
federal counterparts to police discovery; they must instead rely on the 
motion of either a party or of the individual from whom discovery is 
sought.104  The court’s inability to act alone to limit discovery denies 
Oregon judges a potential opportunity to act as a gatekeeper as judges 
can in the federal system.  This means that potentially abusive 
discovery practices can occur essentially unchecked should a party 
elect not to pursue a protective order.  The discretion vested in trial 
courts in Oregon to limit discovery is limited to the terms of ORCP 
36 C.105  If the goal of the ORCP truly is to pursue justice efficiently, 
then allowing the court to act on its own to limit abusive discovery, as 
is the case through the Proportionality Rule, offers an additional 
check on potentially abusive discovery practices. 
This is more efficient, and potentially speedier, because it 
eliminates the procedural step of filing and arguing for a protective 
order and limits the ability of parties to engage in an unwarranted 
discovery war merely to delay the proceeding. 
Additionally, the Proportionality Rule furthers the goal of speedy 
adjudication because it requires parties to consider more efficient 
methods of discovery and information acquisition.  For example, in 
Public Service Enterprise Group the information requested, although 
within the scope of discovery, was held to violate the Proportionality 
Rule.106  The court in that case recognized that the information 
requested was already available to the plaintiff through public 
 
103 Although, as discussed above, there are administrability questions raised by the 
Proportionality Rule, especially because it is essentially a balancing test.  See generally 
Moss, supra note 1; supra text accompanying note 1. 
104 Cf. Lane Transit Dist. v. Lane Cnty., 146 Or. App. 109, 123, 932 P.2d 81, 89 (1997) 
(indicating that discussion at trial of the potential burden incurred because of a discovery 
request was sufficient to place a motion for protective order on the basis of cost before the 
court). 
105 See State ex. rel. Anderson v. Miller, 320 Or. 316, 320, 882 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1994).  
Under ORCP 36 C, the trial court enjoys the discretion to issue a protective order, but only 
if the order is justified by the terms of the rule—to protect a person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.  Id. 
106 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.   
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records, including prior litigation.  Without the Proportionality Rule, 
parties could use duplicative or cumulative discovery requests, 
requests for information otherwise within the scope of discovery 
under ORCP 36 B(1), to burden a party or delay litigation with little 
resulting discovery of any value to the proceeding.  By denying this 
practice, either via motion or on the court’s own initiative under the 
Proportionality Rule, the goal of speedy adjudication is furthered. 
Finally, the Proportionality Rule helps realize the cost-effective 
adjudication of an issue because it recognizes that there are alternative 
and less expensive methods of obtaining the requested information.  
This is similar to the prior discussion about the speedy adjudication of 
justice.  With the astronomical costs associated with litigation 
generally and discovery specifically, the Proportionality Rule offers 
another opportunity for parties and the court to come down on the 
side of cost-effective litigation.  Oregon’s current protective order 
rule provides that discovery can be limited on the grounds of expense, 
but only in the event of financial hardship.107  Under the 
Proportionality Rule, the inquiry does not involve the question of 
hardship but rather evaluates the value of expending financial 
resources given the likely discoverable information.  This difference 
allows the discovery to be limited to avoid unnecessary financial 
expenditures, regardless of the means of the parties.  In practice, this 
distinction means that parties can be sheltered from expensive 
discovery requests even though, by virtue of financial status, 
compliance did not pose a financial hardship.  It can protect, for 
example, wealthier companies and individuals from certain discovery 
requests because of the lack of merit of the request without regard for 
their financial status.  The Proportionality Rule could be of special 
significance given the costs associated with e-discovery. 
B.  The Proportionality Rule Comports with Oregon’s Pleading 
Practice and Use of Discovery 
As noted previously, the low federal notice pleading standard relies 
heavily on discovery to perform the tasks of issue narrowing and fact 
identification.  Since the notice pleading bar is so low—merely 
stating a claim in a short, plain statement—discovery is essential for 
litigation to proceed.  In contrast, Oregon’s fact pleading standard is 
higher.  It requires that a pleading include sufficient facts to state an 
ultimate claim.  To meet this standard, the parties must, in advance of 
 
107 See OR. R. CIV. P. 36 C(9). 
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filing a pleading, have acquired the information necessary to state, 
with facts, an ultimate claim.  While Oregon embraces broad 
discovery practices, because the party needs information for the 
pleading in advance of filing, the role of discovery in Oregon 
litigation is somewhat lessened because some fact investigation must 
necessarily be accomplished before discovery and in advance of filing 
the pleading. 
Under the FRCP, justifications for broad discovery rest heavily on 
the assumption that the broadest possible discovery is crucial given 
the low notice pleading standard.  The Proportionality Rule, while a 
discovery limitation that effectively narrows discovery, is seen as 
consistent with this notice pleading standard and the required 
functions of discovery.  The FRCP Advisory Council concluded that 
the discovery limits at work in the Proportionality Rule are consistent 
with the federal standard of notice pleading, even though discovery is 
technically limited.  If the Proportionality Rule is consistent with 
notice pleading under the federal system, then it must also be 
consistent with the higher fact pleading standard in place in Oregon.  
Therefore, the Proportionality Rule comports with Oregon’s pleading 
standards and the goals of discovery. 
C.  The Proportionality Rule Protects Oregon from Potential 
Litigation-Disrupting E-Discovery 
E-discovery presents unique challenges, some of which have been 
addressed both directly and indirectly in the FRCP, including the 
quantity of documents and the cost associated with storing such 
information and turning it over in discovery.  The Oregon Council on 
Court Procedures should incorporate the Proportionality Rule in the 
ORCP to best ensure that the goals of the ORCP are met, especially in 
the e-discovery age. 
At a minimum, considering the adoption of the Proportionality 
Rule in Oregon is consistent with the purpose of the Council under 
ORS 1.735.  As discovery is so crucial to civil litigation in Oregon, 
the Council should conduct a periodic review of discovery practices 
in Oregon and around the country.  However, a review of the minutes, 
correspondence, and proposals of the Council reveals that discovery is 
almost never a topic of discussion.  Given the FRCP’s adoption of 
26(b)(2)(C) and the Advisory Council’s recognition of the need to 
institute additional measures to guard against over discovery, it is 
only reasonable that the Council consider the increased potential for 
overdiscovery presented by e-discovery. 
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The FRCP has adopted both the Proportionality Rule and the e-
discovery-specific FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) to address the challenges posed 
by e-discovery.  Oregon has yet to take any such steps.  It should 
begin this process by adopting the Proportionality Rule, which would 
limit the potential for abusive discovery practices in both e-discovery 
and traditional discovery contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
Discovery is a crucial component of the civil litigation system in 
our country.  Courts have affirmed, and will likely continue to affirm, 
broad discovery practices.  While broad discovery is necessary, broad 
discovery is not equivalent to unchecked discovery.  Indeed, 
discovery must have some limitations to ensure that the discovery 
process does not hijack litigation.  Broad discovery is susceptible to 
abusive discovery practices.  By adopting the Proportionality Rule, 
Oregon will best be able to pursue its objective of the “speedy, 
efficient, and inexpensive” administration of justice, particularly in 
the age e-discovery. 
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